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TITLE 14

CONTRACTORS'BONDS
Chapter
1. Public Contracts.
2. Private Contracts.

CHAPTER 1
PUBLIC CONTRACTS
Section
14-1-1 to 14-1-17. Repealed.
14-1-18.
DP-finitions - Application of Procurement Code to payment and
performance bonds.

14-1-1 to 14-1-17.

Section
14-1-19.
14-1-20.

Failure of government entity to
obtain payment bond - Right
of action - Notice.
Preliminary notice requirement.

Repealed.

Repeals. - Sections 14-1-J. and 14-1-2 to
14-1-4 (L. 1909, ch. 68, §§ 1, 2; 1917, ch. 36,
§ 2; C.L. 1917, §§ 3753 to 3755; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 17-1-1 to 17-1-4; L. 1961, ch. 27, § 1),
relating to bonds to protect mechanics and materialmen, were repealed by Laws 1963, ch. 15,
§ 6.
Section 14-1-1.1 (L. 1953, ch. 23, § 1), relating to security in connection with bids, was
repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 75, § 5. For present
comparable provisions, see § 63-56-1 et seq.
Sections 14-1-5 to 14-1-12 (L. 1963, ch. 15,

§§ 1 to 5; 1969, ch. 36, §§ 1 to 3), relating to
bonding of contractors for public buildings and
public works, were repealed by Laws 1980, ch.
75, § 5. For present comparable provisions, see
§ 63-56-1 et seq.
Laws 1987, ch. 218, § 13 repeals §§ 14-1-13
to 14-1-17, as enacted by Laws 1983, ch. 61,
§§ 1 to 5, relating to performance and payment
bonds on public projects, effective April 27,
1987. For present comparable provisions, see
§§ 14-1-18, 14-1-19.

14-1-18. Definitions - Application of Procurement
to payment and performance bonds.

Code

(1) (a) For purposes of this chapter, "political subdivision" means any
county, city, town, school district, public transit district, special district,
redevelopment agency, public corporation, institution of higher education
of the state, public agency of any political subdivision, and, to the extent
provided by law, any other entity which expends public funds for construction.
(b) For purposes of applying Section 63-56-38 to a political subdivision,
"state" includes "political subdivision."
(2) Section 63-56-38 applies to all contracts for the construction, alteration,
or repair of any public building or public work of the state or a political
subdivision of the state.
History: C. 1953, 14-1-18, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 218, § 1.

Applicability. - Laws 1987, ch. 218, § 12
provides that ch. 218 applies only to contracts

838

PUBLIC CONTRACTS

14-1-19

executed on or after April 27, 1987, and to persons and bonds in connection with such contracts.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Cox Rock Prods. v. Walker Pipeline
Constr., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 51 et seq.; 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public
Works and Contracts § 99.
C.J.S. - 81A C.J.S. States § 186 et seq.
A.L.R. - Duty of public authority to disclose to contractor information, allegedly in its

possession, affecting cost or feasibility of
project, 86 A.L.R.3d 182.
What constitutes "public work" within stat,
ute relating to contractor's bond, 48 A.L.R.4th
1170.

14-1-19. Failure of government entity to obtain payment
bond - Right of action - Notice.
If the state or a political subdivision fails to obtain a payment bond, it shall,
upon demand by a person who has furnished labor or supplied materials to the
contractor or subcontractor for the work provided for in a contract which is
subject to Section 14-1-18, promptly make payment to that person. That person shall have a direct right of action against the state or the political subdivision in any court having jurisdiction in any county in which the contract was
to be performed, upon giving written notice to the state or political subdivision within 90 days from the date on which such person performed the last of
the labor or supplied the last of the material for which claim is made. The
person shall state in the notice a designation of the construction project and
its location, the amount claimed, and the name of the party for whom the
labor was performed or to whom the material was supplied. The notice shall
be served by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, on the state agency
or political subdivision that is a party to the contract. No such action may be
commenced after the expiration of one year after the day on which the last of
the labor was performed or material was supplied by such person.
History: C. 1953, 14-1-19, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 218, § 2.
Applicability. - Laws 1987, ch. 218, § 12
provides that ch. 218 applies only to contracts

executed on or after April 27, 1987, and to persons and bonds in connection with such contracts.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 186 et seq.
C.J.S. - 81A C.J.S. States § 189 et seq .

•
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14-1-20.

Preliminary

notice requirement.

Except persons who are in privity of contract with a payment bond principal
or except for persons performing labor for wages, any person furnishing labor,
service, equipment, or material for which a payment bond claim may be made
under this chapter shall provide preliminary notice to the payment bond principal as prescribed by Section 38-1-27. Any person who fails to provide this
preliminary notice may not make a payment bond claim under this chapter.
The preliminary notice must be provided prior to commencement of any action
on the payment bond.
History: C. 1953, 14-1-20, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 271, § 1.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1989, ch. 271 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. - Sufficiency of notice to public
works contractor on United States project un-

der Miller Act (40 USCS § 270b(a)), 98 A.L.R.
Fed. 778.

CHAPTER 2
PRIVATE CONTRACTS
Section
14-2-1.
14-2-2.

Definitions - Payment bond required - Right of action - Notice
- Attorneys' fees.
Failure of owner to obtain payment
bond - Liability.

Section
14-2-3, 14-2-4. Repealed.
14-2-5. Preliminary notice requirement.

14-2-1. Definitions - Payment bond required action - Notice - Attorneys' fees.

Right of

(1) For purposes of this chapter:
(a) "Contractor" means any person who is or may be awarded a contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure,
or improvement upon land.
(b) "Owner" means any person contracting for construction, alteration,
or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land.
(2) Before any contract exceeding $2,000 in amount for the construction,
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement upon land is
awarded to any contractor, the owner shall obtain from the contractor a payment bond complying with Subsection (3). The bond shall become binding
upon the award of the contract to the contractor.
(3) The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties satisfactory to the
owner for the protection of all persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or
material in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract in a sum
equal to the contract price.
(4) A person shall have a right of action on a payment bond under this
chapter for any unpaid amount due him if:
(a) he has furnished labor, services, equipment, or material in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract for which the payment
bond is furnished under this chapter; and
840
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(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days after the last day on
which he performed the labor or service or supplied the equipment or
material for which the claim is made.
(5) An action under this section shall be brought in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the county where the contract was to be performed and not
elsewhere. The action is barred if not commenced within one year after the
last day on which the claimant performed the labor or service or supplied the
equipment or material on which the claim is based. The obligee named in the
bond need not be joined as a party to the action. In any action upon a bond, the
court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party, which fees
shall be taxed as costs in the action.
(6) The payment bond shall be exhibited to any interested person upon
request.
(7) In any suit upon a payment bond under this chapter, the court shall
award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.
History: C. 1953, 14-2-1, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 218, § 3; 1989, ch. 7, § 1; 1989, ch.
271, § 2.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1987,
ch. 218, § 3 repeals former § 14-2-1, as
amended by Laws 1985, ch. 219, § 1, relating
to bonds to protect mechanics and materialmen, and enacts the present section.
Amendment Notes. - The 1989 amendment by ch. 7, effective April 24, 1989, divided
former Subsection (4) into present Subsections
(4) to (6), making numerous stylistic changes
therein; substituted "a court of competent jurisdiction" for "the district court" in the first
sentence of Subsection (6); designated former
Subsection (5) as (7); added Subsection (8); and
made various stylistic and phraseology
changes throughout the section.
The 1989 amendment by ch. 271, effective

April 24, 1989, inserted references to "service,"
"services," and "equipment" in Subsections (3)
and (4)(a); deleted provisions at the end of Subsection (4)(a) pertaining to the right of action
upon a payment bond by a person having a
contract with a subcontractor; substituted "a
court of competent jurisdiction in the county"
for "the district court of any county" in the first
sentence of Subsection (4)(b); added the final
sentence in Subsection (4)(b); and made stylistic changes.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Applicability. - Laws 1987, ch. 218, § 12
provides that ch. 218 applies only to contracts
executed on or after April 27, 1987, and to persons and bonds in connection with such contracts.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Acceptance of notes from contractor.
"Building" construed.
Construction and application.
Contract vendee.
Duty to furnish bond.
Failure of builder to require bond.
Lessee of land.
Leveling of land.
Material becoming a part of realty.
Materialmen supplying subcontractor.
Mechanics' lien law.
Performance bond.
Proof of status as materialman.
Purpose of chapter.
Sufficiency of bond.
Supplier not materialman.
Terms of bond.

Unlicensed subcontractor.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Former provisions of this section were constitutional and did not infringe the due process
clause of the Constitution. Rio Grande Lumber
Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241 (1917).
Acceptance of notes from contractor.
Materialman
who accepted contractor's
notes for balance due on materials furnished
was estopped from bringing an action against
owners of the construction projects in question,
who had failed to furnish the bonds required by
this section, for the balance that remained due
after the contractor declared bankruptcy. Apex
Lumber Co. v. Comanche Constr. Co., 18 Utah
2d 119, 417 P.2d 131 (1966).
"Building" construed.
A stationary modular building designed, as-
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sembled and installed in order to be disassembled and removed at some later date with relative ease is a building within the meaning of
this section. John Wagner Assocs. v. Hercules,
Inc., 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert.
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).

Construction and application.
This chapter protects the laborer and materialman as well as the landowner; it makes no
distinction between resident and nonresident.
King Bros. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d
339., 374 P.2d 254 (1962).
Contract vendee.
Buyer of home under construction who executed agreement to purchase home from owner
thereof who was also general contractor for
construction of home was not "owner of any
interest in land" within meaning of statute and
hence was not liable to unpaid materialman;
buyer was, however, liable to unpaid materialman for fixtures added to home which were not
provided for in plans and specifications for the
home and which buyer had specifically requested materialman to install. Harries v.
Valgardson, 19 Utah 2d 433, 432 P.2d 58
(1967).
Duty to furnish bond.
Under this section a bond may be demanded
from the contractor to the lessee to protect lessee and lessor against mechanics' liens.
Bamberger Co. v. Certified Prods., 88 Utah
213, 53 P.2d 1153 (1936).
Failure of builder to require bond.
Owner-builder who failed to require home
contractor to file the bond required by this section was liable for wages due the contractor's
employees, even though the employees had
signed releases and lien waivers for everything
to owner-builder when he paid the employees
for only part of their labor. Pierce v. Pepper, 17
Utah 2d 123, 405 P.2d 345 (1965).
Lessee of land.
Party who entered into contract for construction of lumber curing plant was owner of "interest in land" within meaning of statute, and,
having failed to obtain performance bond as
required by the statute, was liable to materialman upon default of general contractor notwithstanding fact that he was lessee rather
than owner of land. King Bros. v. Utah Dry
Kiln Co., 21 Utah 2d 43, 440 P.2d 17 (1968).
Leveling of land.
Work in leveling is not an improvement
upon land requiring the owner to obtain a bond
from the contractor. Backus v. Hooten, 4 Utah
2d 364, 294 P.2d 703 (1956).
Material becoming a part of realty.
In order to qualify under this chapter it is
necessary that there be an annexation to the

land, or to some permanent structure upon it,
so that t)le materials in question can properly
be regarded as having become a part of the
realty, or a fixture appurtenant to it; and this
must be done with the intention of making it a
permanent part thereof. That the addition is
consistent with the use to which the property is
put is often helpful in making the determination. King Bros. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah
2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962).
An action by a materialman against a landowner for reasonable value of materials supplied to a contractor building a dry kiln plant
for defendant, based on defendant's failure to
require contractor to furnish performance
bond, should not have been dismissed without
the taking of evidence to determine whether
such things as a furnace, furnace casing, motorized fans, pipes, and hoods, which often become permanent adjuncts to a building, were
or were not so used as to come within the
meaning of this section and § 14-2-2. King
Bros. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 339,
374 P.2d 254 (1962).
Aluminum railings and gates installed in a
bank were an "addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon land" affording protection to thirdparty supplier thereof against failure of the
bank to procure a bond from its installing contractor under this section and § 14-2-2. Metals
Mfg. Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74,
395 P.2d 914 (1964).
The fact that modular buildings were erected
under lease agreement rather than construction agreement did not make them personalty,
rather than realty; subcontractor who furnished materials for construction of buildings
was entitled to protection under this section.
John Wagner Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797
P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied,
815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).

Materialmen supplying subcontractor.
Action by materialmen against homeowner
for material supplied subcontractor of bankrupt general contractor was not within purview of the statute where the materialmen
supplied the subcontractor so that the homeowner was not in privity with the materialmen, the homeowner owed nothing to the general contractor and t4e materialmen extended
credit to the subcontractor. Crown Roofing &
Eng'r Co. v. Robinson, 19 Utah 2d 417, 432
P.2d 47 (1967).
Mechanics' lien law.
Statute is auxiliary to mechanics' lien law
and is just as much in aid of it as if it had been
made a part of it. Rio Grande Lumber Co. v.
Parke, 50 Utah 114, 167 P. 241 (1917).
Because of the common purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes (§§ 38-1-1 to 38-1-27)
and contractor's bond statutes (this section and
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§ 14-2-2) and their practically identical language, adjudications as to what is lienable under the former are helpful in determining the
proper application of the latter. King Bros. v.
Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d
254 (1962).

Performance bond.
This section does not require the execution of
a performance bond to assure the owners they
will get what they bargained for in their contract with the general contractor. Lignell v.
Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979).
Proof of status as materialman.
Invoice between plaintiff and installer, reciting that merchandise was purchased for resale,
was not conclusive evidence that plaintiff was
a materialman entitled to the benefits of this
statute. Crane Co. v. Utah Motor Park, Inc., 8
Utah 2d 413, 335 P.2d 837 (1959).
Purpose of chapter.
Purpose of this statute is to prevent landowners from having their lands improved by
third persons, without becoming personally responsible for reasonable value of materials and
labor. Liberty Coal & Lumber Co. v. Snow, 53
Utah 298, 178 P. 341 (1919).
Sufficiency of bond.
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon contractor's faithful performance of contract and
containing no express provision for payment of
materialmen, was sufficient ·under this section
to exonerate an owner from liability, and to
sustain the right of the materialmen to sue the
surety, in view of the fact that the contract
expressly required the contractor to pay for all
labor and materials. De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116 Utah 144, 208 P.2d 1127 (1949).
Where owners of tract of land upon which a
franchised restaurant was built accepted performance bond from the contractor, the obligation of which ran only to them and not to "all
other persons as their interest may appear,"

14-2-2

they were liable for payment of judgment for
materials delivered, even though the contractor had been hired by the restaurant chain and
owners had no privity of contract with him,
since they had dealt directly with the contractor and had supervised payment of subcontractors. Bennett v. Downard, 533 P.2d 1348 (Utah
1975).

Supplier not materialman.
Where defendant agreed to sell carpet to
homeowners and bought the carpet on his own
account from plaintiff, without any contract for
the alteration or repair of the homeowners'
premises, plaintiff was not a materialman under this section and could not assert that the
homeowners were personally liable for payment for the carpet due to their failure to obtain a bond as required under § 14-2-2. Bailey
v. Parker, 778 P.2d 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Terms of bond.
Where the condition of the bond is that the
surety will indemnify the owner if the contractor fails to pay for material and labor, it is not
such a bond contemplated by this section so as
to allow a direct action by the materialman
against the surety, as it does not promise that
the contractor will pay for the material and
labor. Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. Phoenix
Indem. Co., 3 Utah 2d 150, 280 P.2d 448
(1955).
Unlicensed subcontractor.
The fact that a subcontractor is unlicensed
will not bar his right to sue on a bond or directly against the owner who fails to require a
bond. Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299
P.2d 837 (1956). (But see § 58-55-17 and its
notes.)
Cited in Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Graco Fishing & Rental
Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766
P.2d 1074 (Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 1 et seq.
C.J.S. - 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256.
A.L.R. - Effect on compensation of archi-

tect or building contractor of express provision
in private building contract limiting the cost of
the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778.

14-2-2. Failure of owner to obtain payment bondity.

Liabil-

(1) Any owner who fails to obtain a payment bond is liable to each person
who performed labor or service or supplied equipment or materials under the
contract for the reasonable value of the labor or service performed or the
equipment or materials furnished up to but not exceeding the contract price.
843
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(2) No action to recover on this liability may be commenced after the expiration of one year after the day on which the last of the labor or service was
performed or the equipment or material was supplied by the person.
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a bond, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. These fees shall be taxed as costs
in the action.
History: C. 1953, 14-2-2, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 218, § 4; 1989, ch. 271, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1987,
ch. 218, § 4 repeals former § 14-2-2, as
amended by Laws 1965, ch. 24, § 1, relating to
failure to require bond, and enacts the present
section.
Amendment Notes. - The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, rewrote the section which read "Any owner who fails to obtain
a payment bond is liable to all persons who
have performed labor or have supplied mate-

rials under the contract for the reasonable
value of the labor performed or materials furnished. No action to recover on such liability
may be commenced after the expiration of one
year after the day on which the last of the
labor was performed or the material was supplied by such person."
Applicability. - Laws 1987, ch. 218, § 12
provides that ch. 218 applies only to contracts
executed on or after April 27, 1987, and to persons and bonds in connection with such contracts.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Application of statute of limitations.
Burden of proof.
Construction of terms of bond.
Duty to exact bond.
Failure of builder to require bond.
Installment payments by debtor-contractor.
Limitation period.
- Measured by substantial performance.
,
Mortgagee's liability for prepayment of general
contractor.
Prejudgment interest.
Sufficiency of bond.
Supplier as materialman.
Unlicensed subcontractor.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Former provisions of this section were constitutional and did not violate due process. Rio
Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 Utah 114, 167
P. 241 (1917).

Application of statute of limitations.
Since § 14-2-1 imposes a duty upon the
owner of property to require a contractor's
bond, the statute of limitations applies only to
suits involving such bonds, obtained by contractor at the behest of the owner; thus where a
general contractor required a subcontractor to
furnish a bond to protect himself and materialmen, the applicable statute of limitations in a
suit by an unpaid materialman was § 78-1223, and this section did not apply. Arnold
Mach. Co. v. Prince, 550 P.2d 193 (Utah 1976).
Burden of proof.
A materialman must prove only that its ma-

terials were consumed in a building; it is not
necessary that a materialman go further and
also prove that the building is an improvement
upon the land. John Wagner Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
cert. denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).

Construction of terms of bond.
Terms of a bond which attempted to restrict
period for commencement of an action on the
bond to ninety days was regarded as surplusage and the one-year period in this section was
applicable. Oscar E. Chytraus Co. v. Wasatch
Furnace & Elec., Inc., 28 Utah 2d 339, 502 P.2d
554 (1972).
Duty to exact bond.
Where agreement between a son who owned
real property and his father required the latter
to construct a dwelling upon the land of the
son, and provided that the father would pay
the cost of constructing the house, the son had
a duty to require the father to execute the bond
but, in absence of securing such bond, he was
liable for value of materials. Liberty Coal &
Lumber Co. v. Snow, 53 Utah 298, 178 P. 341
(1919).
Failure of builder to require bond.
Property owner who failed to obtain bond
was liable to a materialman for materials furnished to a contractor erecting block walls for
the property owner, even though the owner, at
the time of payment for materials used by himself when he completed construction of the
building, received a release of all claims from
the materialman. Roberts Inv. Co. v. Gibbons
& Reed Concrete Prods. Co., 22 Utah 2d 105,
449 P.2d 116 (1969).
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Failure by an owner to procure required
bond from a general contractor does not result
in absolute liability upon the contractor's default; where the owner had paid the general
contractor all sums owing in reliance on lien
waivers signed by the subcontractor acknowledging receipt of payment not in fact received,
there was an issue of material fact as to the
rights of the parties when the subcontractor
sought payment from the owner upon the general contractor's insolvency. J.P. Koch, Inc. v.
J.C. Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975).

Installment payments by debtor-contractor.
The lower court erred in granting summary
judgment to a materialman where it appeared
from the pleadings that the contractor owed
the materialman a large sum for several contracting jobs and was paying off the materialman by furnishing him sand and where it was
not clear whether the credit given the contractor's account for such sand deliveries had applied to the materials used in the project. Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Paulos Auto Co., 17 Utah
2d 402, 413 P.2d 596 (1966).
Limitation period.
-

Measured by substantial performance.
Doctrine of substantial performance is applicable to this statute to make limitation period
begin to run upon substantial completion of
work; where a heating subcontract was substantially completed on December 23, 1968,
the fact that one minor item representing a
minimal part of the value of the subcontract
was not furnished until February 19, 1969 did
not extend the limitation period for filing action on bond. Carlisle v. Cox, 29 Utah 2d 136,
506 P.2d 60 (1973).
Mortgagee's liability for prepayment of
general contractor.
Where general contractor, employed to construct a house, was not required to produce a
surety bond and the owner's mortgagee paid
the general contractor his full compensation
knowing that the general contractor had not
paid materialmen and laborers, the owner of
the project was liable to materialmen and laborers not paid by the general contractor and
the mortgagee, joined by the owner as a thirdparty defendant, was liable to the owner for an
identical amount. Home Elec. Corp. v. Russell,
17 Utah 2d 276, 409 P.2d 388 (1965).
Prejudgment interest.
Materialman, having obtained a judgment

14-2-2

against the owner because of the owner's failure to furnish a bond to protect the materialman against contractor's default, was entitled
to prejudgment interest from the date of first
notice to the owner for demand of payment,
and not from the due date indicated on the invoice, where at time the debt was due, credit
was being extended to the contractor by the
materialman for already past-due debts. Triple
I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d
1298 (Utah 1982).

Sufficiency of bond.
A surety bond, conditioned merely upon contractor's faithful performance of contract, and
containing no express provision for payment of
materialmen, was sufficient under this section
to exonerate an owner from liability, and to
sustain right ofmaterialmen to sue the surety,
in view of the fact that the contract expressly
required the contractor to pay for all labor and
materials. De Luxe Glass Co. v. Martin, 116
Utah 144, 208 P.2d 1127 (1949).
Supplier as materialman.
Supplier was a materialman entitled to recovery under this section in view of evidence
establishing that materials were delivered to a
plumbing subcontractor for a specific job
rather than on open account and that the supplier's records enabled it to identify the contract job to which it delivered the materials
and separate those materials from the subcontractor's other purchases. Lawson Supply Co.
v. General Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 27 Utah
2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972).
Where defendant agreed to sell carpet to
homeowners and bought the carpet on his own
account from plaintiff, without any contract for
the alteration or repair of the homeowners'
premises, plaintiff was not a materialman under this section and could not assert that the
homeowners were personally liable for payment for the carpet due to their failure to obtain a bond as required under this section.
Bailey v. Parker, 778 P.2d 1005 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Unlicensed subcontractor.
Fact that a subcontractor is unlicensed will
not bar his right to sue on a bond or directly
against the owner who fails to require a bond.
Whipple v. Fuller, 5 Utah 2d 211, 299 P.2d 837
(1937). (But see § 58-55-17 and its notes.)
Cited in Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc.
v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074
(Utah 1988).

845

14-2-3

CONTRACTORS' BONDS
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Arn. Jur. 2d. - 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contractors'
Bonds § 1 et seq.
C.J.S. - 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 256.

14-2-3, 14-2-4. Repealed.
Repeals. - Laws 1987, ch. 218, § 13 repeals
§§ 14-2-3 and 14-2-4, as enacted by Laws 1963,
ch. 16, § [1] and Laws 1986, ch. 207, § 1, relat-

14-2-5. Preliminary

ing to attorney's fees and exceptions for mortgages, beneficiaries, and trustees, effective
April 27, 1987.

notice requirement.

Except subcontractors who are in privity of contract with a payment bond
principal or except for persons performing labor for wages, any person furnishing labor, service, equipment, or material for which a payment bond
claim may be made under this chapter shall provide preliminary notice to the
payment bond principal as prescribed by Section 38-1-27. Any person who
fails to provide this preliminary notice may not make a payment bond claim
under this chapter. The preliminary notice must be provided prior to commencement of any action on the payment bond.
History: C. 1953, 14-2-5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 271, § 4.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1989, ch. 271 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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